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Governance and anarchy in the
s. 2(b) jurisprudence: A comment on
Vancouver Sun and Harper v. Canada
.Jamie Cameron·

1. GOVERNANCE ANO ANARCHY IN CONSTITUTIONAL

DECISION MAKING
A bi polar conceplio n of the guarantee has rcsullcd in rnntradiclio ns
and double s tandards, w hich are the de fi ning features or the Supreme
Coun's seclio n 2(b) j urisprude nce. Rather than break il, the Court 's
dec isio ns in Vancouver Sun, Re 1 a nd Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)2 confirm a pallern in whic h a mode l o r governa nce co-cx isls w ith
methodological anarchy of sons. Governance, in this paper, refers Lo a
syslcm o r rules or principles thal direct and regulate decision maki ng
fro m o ne case lo the next. Absent a syste m, lhc sectio n 2(b) j urisprude nce
is capricious, and a caplive of instincts which s hift from j udge to j udge,
case lo case, and issue to issue. If anarchistic is harsh, it nonetheless
describes a resu lt-based jurisprudence which lacks the discipline of
princ ipled adj udication. While Vancouver Sun fits the governance

* Protcssor, Osgoodc Hall Law School.

2

(2004), [20041 2 S.C .R. 332, [2004] S.C.J. No. 4 1, 2004 CarswellBC 1376,
2004 CarswcllBC 1377. 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 26 1, 120 C. R.R. (2cl) 203, [2005] 2
W . W .R. 671. (sub nom. Applica1io11 Under Section 83.28 of the Criminal Code,
Re) 322 N.R. 16 1, 2 1 C.R. (6th) 142, (sub norn. R. v. llagri) 184 C.C.C. (3d)
5 15, (sub norn. R. v. Bagri) 240 D.L.R. (4th) 147, (sub nom. App/ica1ion Under
Section 83.28 ofthe Criminal Code, Re) 199 B.C.A.C. I , 2004 SCC43 (S.C.C.).
r20041 I S.C.R. 827, f2004] S.C.J. No. 28, 2004 CarswellAlla 646, 2004
Carsw el1 A lla647, 239 D .L.R. (4th) 193, 11 9 C.R.R. (2d) 84, 348 A.R. 20 1,32!
W.A.C. 20 1, L200418 W.W.R. I , 27 Alta. L.R. (4th) I, 2004 SCC33, 320 N.R.

49 (S.C.C.).
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model, Hwper v. Canada (Auom ey General) is an example of resulldriven decision making.
Not long afler it saved campaign spending limits in H arper,l the
Supreme Court concluded lhat a prcsumplion of openness applies lo
investigalivc hearings that are inilialed under Parliamenl's anti-terror
lcgislation.4 Aller upholding the provision in a companion case,.~ a majority led a second time by deparling Justices Iacobucci and A rbour
applied the presumption to investigati ve hearings under section 83 .28,
and set a high threshold for derogations from the open court principle.6
In doing so the joint opinion was unsympathetic to the argumc111 that
the presumption shou ld be displaced, either because lhesc proceed ings
arc investigal ivc or because the hearings are a vital clement in Parliament's li ght against terrorism. The judges found instead that the same
standard applies to lhis prov ision as lo derogations from open court in
other scttings.7 Vancouver Sun is a model of governance in constitutional
adjudication because principle prevai led over lhe claim thal the Coun

3

Tile Canada Elections Act ("'C.E.A."'), S.C. 2000, c . 9, s. 350 limi t:. thi ru pully
election advcrti5ing to $3.000.00 per electoral district and $ 150,000.00 nation-

ally.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985. c. C-46, s. 83.28 (The Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C.
200 1. c. 4 1).
5 AJ1plica1ion Under s. 83.28 of 1/ie Criminal Code, Re (2004), 2004 SCC 42,
120041 S.C.J . No. 40, 2004 Carswell BC 1378, 2004 CarswellBC 1379. 120041
2 S.C.R. 248, 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 195, 12 1 C. R.R. (2d) I, [2005J 2 W.W.R. 605,
2 1 C. R. (6th) 82, 322 N .R. 205, (sub no m. R. v. 8ug ri) 184 C.C.C. (3d) 449,
(sub 110 111. R. v. Bagri) 240 D.L.R. (4 th) 81, 199 B .C.A.C. 45 (S.C.C.).

4

6

Va11co11ver S1111, supra, note I.

1

Sec Dagenais

1•.

Canadian fJroadcasting Corp., [1994) 3 S.C.R. 835, 1994

Can.wcllOnt I 12, 1994 CarswcllOm I 168, [ 1994 f S.C.J. No. I 04, 34 C.R. (4 th)
269. 20 0.R. (3d) 8 16 (note). 120 D.L.R. (4th) 12. 175 N.R. I , 94 C.C.C. (3d)
289, 76 0.A.C. 8 1, 25 C.R.R. (2d) I. 1994 SCC 102 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Me11111ck
(200 1), 1200 113S.C.R.442. 200 I CarswellMan 535, 200 1 Carswell M an 536,
76. 158
(3d) 449. 205 D .L.R. (4th) 5 12.
[200 I ] S.C.J . No. 73, 2001
47 C.R. (5th) 63. 277 N.R. 160. f2<Xl2 I 2 W . W.R. 409, 163 Man. R. (2d) I , 269
W .A.C. I (S.C .C.). Under that test, exceptions are permissible when:
(a) such an order is necessary in ordcn o prevelll a serious ri sk LO the proper
administration o f j usti ce because reasonabl y alternat ive measures will
not prevent the ri sk; and
(b) the salutary effects o f the publicati on ban outweigh the deleteriouseffects
on the rights and interests or the panics and the publit:, including the
effect:. on the 1ig ht to free cxp1c:.:.io n, the right o f the accused to a fair
and pub lic tri al, and the cfli cacy or the administrati on o f justice.

sec

c.c.c.
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should defer to the state's assessment of stra tegy in the war on terrorism,
including the need for secret investi gative hearings.
For these reasons, Vancouver Sun represents a high waler mark for
1hc open court principle. The decision is yet more remarkable when
j uxtaposed wich Harper which, almost simultaneously, defined a new
low point in the section 2(b) j urisprudence. There, the Court upheld
Parliament's limits on th ird party advertising.11 In doing so, the majority
opinion could not save the restriction without <lcpari:ing from its own
case law on participation in the democratic process. BastaraeheJ. upheld
the legislation because he and other members in the majority agreed that
third parties should not have a credible voice in election debate. The
resul t was anan.:histic, in this paper's sense of the word, because Harper
v. Canada (Attorney General) resi sted section 2(b)'s values, as well as
the evidentiary requirements of section I, to uphold provisions that
effecti vely exclude citizens from the democratic process.
A comparison of these cases con firms the presence double standards in the section 2(b) j urisprudence. For instance, after applying a
low standard of justification in Hmper, the Court set a high threshold
for lim its on the open court principle in Vancouver Sun. Both limes the
expressi ve activity was al the core lhc guarantee, but while the Court
deferred lo Parl iament on the quest ion of third party spending, it refused
to grant the same latitude to Lhe government's claim thal proceedings
under section 83.28 must be conducted in secret. M oreover, access was
at the heart in both cases. While the issue in Harper was one of access
to the electoral process and the right lo participate in the election debate,
the secrecy order::; challenged in Vancouver Sun denied the public access
Lo information about the existence of an investigati ve hearing into terrorist. activities. [n fact, the argument for an exception Lo the open court
principle was stronger in Vancouver Sun than Lhe evidence of reasonable
limits was in Harper. Whereas Vancouver Sun followed the model of

or

or

governance the Court had devel oped in the open court contex t, Haq1er

ignored the evidence and demands or principle to uphold Ii mils which
failed established standards of constitutional adjudication. And that, as
chis paper will show, is the difference bc1wecn governance or principlehased decision making, and anarchy, or rcsult-hased adjudication .
This paper develops these themes by commenting on the two decisions. From the perspecti ve of Vancouver Sun, the first section explains
why the open court jurisprudence is a section 2(b) success story. Perhaps
for that reason, this part of the paper is brief in comparison wi th i ts next

8 Suwa, nolc 2.
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section, which focuses on Harper v. Canada (Attorney General). The
discussion of Harper begins by reviewing the Court's decisions on
participation in the democratic process. Doing so reveals that the majority opinion in Harper avoided the force of precedent to uphold the
C.E.A. 's third party spending limits. Then, an analysis of the majority
opinion shows how it also ignored established principle and abandoned
the requirement that limits on the Charter's guarantees be justified by
evidence.
Though an unfavourable assessment of Harper is unavoidable, the
paper's purposes are positive, rather than negative. A final section returns to a comparison between these two approaches to adjudication
under section 2(b). As Harper shows, the Court's decisions on certain
questions too often abandon principle in favour of unspoken assumptions
about the relative value of the expressive activity in question; instincts
about whether and to what extent the activity is "harmful"; a rough
calculus of whether the limit on expressive freedom is too unforgiving
to be saved under section l; and a political calculus of whether deference
is appropriate, either to divert institutional criticism or to forestall a
confrontation with Parliament. This paper suggests that the Court can
avoid the anarchy of result-based adjudication by adapting and applying
the open court model to other section 2(b) issues. Not only would the
adoption of a governance-based approach address the problem of double
standards and promote consistency, it would ensure that limits on section
2(b) activity arc based on the evidence and not on subjective perceptions
about the expressive activity at stake and its relative value. Having
explained that the open court jurisprudence provides a model, the last
section also indicates how its key clements can be adapted and applied
to other branches of the case law, to avoid the anarchy which is all too
often indicative of a result-based approach to decision making.

2. RE VANCOUVER SUN
(a) The Open Court Principle: A section 2(b) Success Story
The open court jurisprudence is a section 2(b) success story because
the Court developed a principled model or system of governance in this
setting, which it faithfully applies to these issues. The jurisprudence is
described here as a success story because the Court's methodology
protects the principle's underlying values but permits exceptions when
the circumstances at hand meet the model's standard of justification. An
approach that focuses attention on the relationship between principle
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and the evidence in particu lar cases oners a model for adjudication which
should be followed on other issues. Vancouver Sun is the most recent in
a series or decisions that exemplify this approach to open court under
the Charier.
Hdmonton Journal v. Alberta (Allorney General) was one of the
Court's early initiatives in developing a model of governance to ensure
that access to proceedings and publ icity would nOL he i nhihitcd hy
c losure orders and publ ication bans." The three elements of the model
can be found in most of the Court's open justice decisions. First and
foremost arc the principle's underlying values. 111 Section 2(b)'s values
arc recited in most of the jurisprndence; in the context of open justice,
though, the values play more than a rhetorical role. Not only are they
activel y discussed and affirmed, they support a presumption in favour
of openness that is not easil y displaced.
The second clement of the methodology, then, is a doctrinal framework that is designed to protect those values oy defining and limi ting
the scope of derogations from the open courl principle. Chier Justice
Larner created the templ<ile in Dagenais v. Canadian /Jroadcasling
Corp.; I.hat Lcmplatc was then adapted and further entrenched in the
j urisprudence in Camulian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Al torney General), as well <is in R. v. Men tuck and R. v. O.N.H. 11 The
Dagenai.~!Me111uck standard which emerged sets sLructured criteria
which must he satisfied every time an exception is granted.
A third aspect of this model grants the evidence a central role i n the
decision making process. As a result, the Court has consistently stressed
that exceptions wi ll not be permitted unless an cvidcntiary record estah9

( 1989).1 198912 S.C.R. 1326, 1989 CarswellAlta 198. 1989 CarswellAlta 623,
[ 19891 S.C.J. N u. 124. 119901 I W.W.R. 577, 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 102 N.R.
32 1, 71 A ha. L.R. (2u) 273, 103 A. R. 32 1, 41 C.P.C. (2d ) 109, 45 C.R.R. I,
19s9 sec 133 (S.c.c.).
10 Sec, e.g., Ht/1110111011 .loumal, ibid. (perCo ry J.); Ca11adia11 JJroadcas1i111:1 Corp.
v. New /Jmnnvick (A 11om ey General), [ 1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, 1996 CarswcllNB
462. 1996 CarswellNB 463, l 1996] S.CJ. No. 38, 2 C.R. (5th) I, 110 C.C.C'.
(3d) 193. 139 D.L.R.(4th) 385. 182 N.B.R.(2d)8 1, 463A.P.R 81 ,39C.R.R.
(2d) 189. 203 N.R. 169. 2 B.H.R.C. 2 10 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Me11111ck. supra.
note 7.
11 Sec, e.g., Dagenais v. Canadian /Jroadcas1i11g Corp., supra note 7; Canadian

/Jroadcas1i11g Corri. v. New /Jrun.nvick (Ariorney General), ibid.; Me11111ck,
ibid. ; and R. v. 0 .N.IJ.)(200 I), ! 200 113S.C.R.478, 200 1 CarswellBC 2479,
200 I Carswell BC 2480. 120011 S.C.J. No. 74, 200 I SCC 77, 158 C.C.C. (Jd)
478, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 542, 47 C.R. (5th) 89, 279 N.R. 187. 97 B.C.L.H. (3d)
I , 1200213 W.W.R. 205, 160 B.C.A.C. 16 1, 261 W.A.C. 161 (S.C.C.).
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lishe their j ustifiabili ty. It is axiomatic that limits on Charter guarantees
must be demonstrably justifi ed under section 1. A nd though the purpose
of the Oakes lest was, in part, to ensure that limits which are not substantiated would not be upheld, the Cou rt has been inconsistent in its
approach lo the evidence. The open court j urisprudence is dilTerenl,
because there the Court has consistently demanded evidence to support
derogations from that principle. 12
Long before the arrival of constitutional righ ts, open court was a
featured principle of the common law and its conception of the j ustice
system's responsibility to the public. Macln1yre v. Nova Scolia ( Allomey
General) was the decision that forged a link between a tradition of
openness at common law and the constitutionalization of rights under
the CharterY

(h) Macintyre v. Nova Scotia (Attomey Gelleral) and the

Covertness Exception
Macinty re is the key, both to the constillltionalization of open cou1t
under the Charter, and LO the status of that principle in invcstigati w
proceedings. By granting openness significant protection at common
law, while recogni zing the need for exceptions to protect competi ng
interests, Macintyre showed the Court the way underthc Charrer. There,
a journalist sought access to search warrants which had been issued on
an ex parte basis in the course of a criminal investigation. Dickson J.
held that though access lo such materials should he denied while an
investigation is underway, the interest in maintaining covertness ends
12

exceptions remain , as in Sierra Club of Cm10da v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522. 2002 CarswcllNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823.
[2002] S.C'.J. No. 42, 2002 SC'C 41. (suh nom. Atomic Energy of Cmwda Ltd.
v. Sierra Club of Canada) 21 1 D.L. R. (4th) 193. (sub nom. Atomic Energy of
Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 18 C.P.R. (4th) I, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.)
16 1. 287 N .R. 203. 20 C.P.C. (5th) I. 40 Aclmin. L.R. (3d) I, (sub nom. Atomic
Energy of Canada L rd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, 223
F.T.R. 137 (note) (S.C.C.) {upholding a conliclcntiality order in civil proceedings); also, it is problematic that the lower courts have not gran ted the open
cou11 p1inciple the same degree of respect as the Supreme Cou11 ; sec " An
Excessive Use of Publication Bans", The G lobe & M ail, Scptcmbcr20, 2004,
at Al2.

13

1198211S.C.R.175, 1982CarswcllNS2 1, 1982CarswcllNS ll0,49 N.S.R.
(2d) 609, 40 N.R. 18 1, 26C. R. (3d) 193, 96 A. P.R. 609, 132 D .L. R. (3d) 385,
(sub nom. Nova Scotia (A11omey General) v. Macintyre) 65 C.C.C. (2d) 129

(S.C.C.).
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once the search warrant's work is over. AL lhat point, Lhe value in
openness prevai ls over the need for an except ion during the active phase
or investigation.
Dickson J. 's opinion in Macintyre pro vided a template for the model
of governance that evolved under the Charter. In doing so it incorporated
the underly ing values of open court into lhc Courl's reasons, and then
developed criteria to determine access to investigati ve materials. The
j udge recognized I.hat limits are necessary at the investigati ve stage of
the criminal process, bmh Lo proteeL Lhe innocent from premalllre publicity and public suspicion, and to ensure that law enforcement objectives
arc not pul at risk. Yet he also rejected the argument that covertness is
a necessary incidenL of the investigation al all stages or the process.
Having explai ned that " covertness is the exception and openness the
rule," 1• and added that the ra tionale or the open court principle is "maximum accounLability and accessibility", 1 ~ he held that the principle
openness applies in j udicial proccc<lings, wha1ever their nature, and in
the exercise of judicial powers. 16 And so he rejected a distinction bet.ween tria l and pretrial proceedings, because Parliament had seen fit " t.o
invol ve the judiciary" in the issuance or search warrants. 17 Dickson J.
concluded that all judicial proceedings must be held in public, whether
they are part or a trial or not. 1X In the end, he proposed the foll owing
compromise between the open court principle and the need for secrecy:
though members or the public should not have access to the appl ication
or lo warran t materials while investigative steps arc being acti vely taken,
once the in vestigation has concluded the materials arc subjecL to the
open court princ iple and must be accessible to members of the public. '"
In dissent, Martland J. stated thaL the function o f a j ustice may be
considered to be a j udicial function, but " might more properly be described as a fu nction performed by a judicial o fficcr". 20 Investigation
does not lead to a requ irement of openness, in his view, because it is not

or

14
15
I6
17

18
19

20

Ibid. , al 185.
Ibid., al 184.
Ibid. , at 185 (emphasis added).
!hid. , at 186.
!hid. (emphasis added).
!hid. , al 189 (concluding that the administration of justice does jus1ify an i11
camera proceedings when the warrant is issued, bul finding that once the
warrant has heen executed, "exclusion thereafter of memhers of lhe public
cannot normally hecountenanced"and lhatagcncra l rule of acccss musl prevail
except in respect of those w ho may he considered " innoccnl persons").
Ibid. , al 197.
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mandalory lhal search warranlS be authorized in open comt, and the
judge ne ither adjudicates nor makes any order. A l the same time, d isc losing search warrant informatio n could damage a variety of interests ,
he thought, including the fa ir trial o f a n accused, the safety of informants,
law e nfo rceme nt goals, and the reputatio n of innocent pe rsons unconnected with the commission of an offence. Martland J. concluded tha t
the search warrant process is not analogous to trial proceedings, and that
opening search warrant documents to publ ic inspection " is not equivalent to the right of the public to attend and witness proceedings in
court". 21
On its face, section 83.28 is investigato ry in nature.22 From thal
perspective, Macintyre could support a conclusion that the o pen court
pri nciple sho uld be displaced in favour of in camera hearings during
that phase of the investigation. At the same time, section 83.28 hearings
are held in court under judicial s upervis ion. In that regard, Macintyre
could direct a contrary conclusion, that the proceedings must be open
because the judic iary is involved. Vancouver Sun required the S upre me
Court to choose between two interpretations of Macintyre.

(c) Section 83.28 and the Judicialization of the Investigative
Process
T he joint majority opinion by Justices Iacobucc i a nd Arbour began
by noting the extraordinary and novel nature of the proceedings. As far
as the Court was aware, the challenge Lo section 83.28 2 ~ and its Vancouver Sun compa nion we re the first cases to arise under the a nti-te rror
legislation.24 This provisio n empowers the Crown to compel a wi tness
to allend a hearing and provide sworn evide nce in aid of an investigation
into terrorist activities. The re a re two parts to the process: the Crown
must apply, initially, for a judic ial order authorizing a hearing; a nd once
that order is g ranted, the hearing whic h follows takes place in court
before a judge. 25 The question in Vancouver Sun was whether the ope n
court princ iple applied to e ither or bmh parts of the section 83.28 process.

21
22
23
24

25

/bid.,at 20 1.
Supra, note 4.
Supra, note 5.
Supra, note I.
Sees. 83.28(4) & (5), dea ling with the making and co ntents o f an order to
attend a hearing, and (8), making it mandatory for the investigatec to answer
questions; supra, note 4.
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While the majority opi nion in Vancouver Sun consistently referred
LO it as a "judicial invcstigati ve hearing", B astarache J.' s minority opi nion characLcr izcJ section 83.28 proceedings as an "investigati ve hearing". As far as he was concerned, hearings under th<1t provision are
investigative in nature and Madntyre's reasons for recognizing a "covertness exception" should apply. Although the investigati ve hearings
under section 83.28 arc a "new form of proceeding", Bastarache J.
claimed that they raise "essentially the same issues" the Court had
considered " in the context of other investigati ve tools''.2<' He observed
that elsewhere, the Court had accepted the " necessity of clandest ine
proceedings" and that "fs]ccrecy therefore has been recognized as paramount in other settings which apply equally to terrorist groups or
organizations".27 Concerns arising from the disclosure of information,
including the reputation of innocent individuals, witness safety, and the
efficacy of in vestigat ive proceedings were in his view al least as strong,
i f not stronger, under section 83.28 than in other investigative contexts
such as search warrants and wiretaps.2K
Bastarache J. was lherefore unwill ing to assign seclion 83.28's investigative hear ing a judicial characler to which a presumption of openness would apply. He noled thal the purpose
the hearing is to gather
information and that the judge's role is limited. ln such circumslances,
he found a requirement of openness counterproducti ve, because he
claimed that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to rebut the presumption and meet the evidentiary burden of the Oagenais/Mentuck test.
As he explained, "l l]hc presumplion of openness cannot operate in
ci rcumstances where it cannot in fact he rchutted". 29 Because holding
section 83.28 hearings in puhl ic wou ld threaten countervai ling interests,
he concluded that proceedings under chis rrov ision will "normally" be
held in camera. ~0 Under his view, a requirement of openness would not
he acti vated unti l the hearing is over, at which time ruhlic access could
only be denied under the le nns of the Dasenai!>!Mentuck lest. 11
M eanwhile, Justices A rbour and Iacobucci did not agree that a hearing which is investigative in nature must he held in secret. ln their view,
section 83.28' s creation of a judicial investigati ve hearing triggered the

or

Vancouver S1111, :;upra, note I, at parn. 73.
Ibid. , al para. 75.
28 lbid.,at parn!;. 73-76.
29 lbid.,at pan1. 63.
30 lbicl. ,at pam. 84.
3 1 lbid.,at pan1. 83.

26

27
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presumption o r openness. In addition, the majority opinion rejected the
view that the extraordinary selling of lhe anti -cerror legislat ion made a
d ifference. Once Parliament chose to involve the judiciary, they said,
hearings under section 83.28 must be as faithful l o the open court principle "as is compatible with the task at hand". 32 Iacobucci and Arbour
JJ. stated that judges who arc granted a discretion under section
83.28(5)(e) to determine the terms and conditions of hearings shou ld
reject secrecy and appl y a presumpti on of openness instead.
Once having characterized the investigative hearing as judicial in
nature, the open court principle became the majority's default posi ti on.
The j udges concluded chac covertness is an exception which can only be
permitted at certain points in the process, and then only on evidence that
demonstrates the need for that exception on an issue to i ssue and case
to case basis. As the joint opinion explai ned, the presumption "should
only be displaced upon proper consideration of the competing interests
at every stage of the process".D As much as the subject matter of the
cxis1cnce of a section 83.28 order should be made public as possible,
they maintained, " unless, under the balancing exerci se of the Dagenafa!
Mentuck test, secrecy becomes necessary".:'< Once the existence or an
order is made public, the judge should then determine, under the same
test, whether " any information ought to be withheld from the public".35
In applying the Dagenais/Mentuck approach to any decisi on to hold a
hearing in camera, the majority opinion indicated that judges "should
expect to be presented with evidence credible on its face of the risks that
an open inquiry would present, including ev idence of the information
expected to be revealed by a witness".16

(d) Secrecy and the Air India Trial
As the dissent pointed out, in vain, the Dagenais/Mentuck test requires an evidentiary basis for limits on openness which perhaps cannot
be establ ished in proceedings where the evidence is unknown at the time
an exception i s sought. Not only did Bastarache J. rely on an analogy to
other investigative procedures to demonstrate why such a high standard
of proof is inappropriate, his opinion considered the risks inherent in

32

33
34

lbid. ,at. para. 38.
lbid. ,al para. 39 (emphasis in original).
/bid.,(ernph<isi s adde::d)

35 lbid. ,al para. 40.
36 lbid.,al para. 43.
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opening up invcsligative hearings. ~ 7 A hhough lhc majority opinion
agreed thal " li l t may very well be lhal by necessily large parls of judicial
invest igati ve hearings w ill be held in secrcl" , lhc Courl's fcally to the
open court principle and lhe evidentiary requirements w hich must be
met lo displace i t did not waver. ~~
The sl ate's powers under section 83.28 are extraordinary, and those
powers were pul Lo unusual use in case.The Crown began section 83.28
proceedings to see whe1her it could holster iLs evidence in the Air India
trial, which was al the time underway in a different courtroom under the
another judge.'9 The ex parle order authorizing an in vessupervision
tigati ve hearing required the Named Person, who was not charged w ith
any offence, to atlcnd in <.:ourL and gi ve sworn information relating Lo
the A ir India crash and the Crow n's theory that il was caused hy a
terrorist bomb. The j udge ordered that the hearing he in camera and
prohi bited the Named Person from disclosing any i nformation pertaining
to the hearin g. The Named Person challenged the constitutionali ty of
section 83.28, and Lhal hearing was also held in camera. The judge w ho
heard the application dismissed the investigatee' s cons1i1Utional chal lenge.
Nei1her the press nor the public had notice of proceedings wh ich
were conducled entirely in secret The two accused in the ongoing Air
I ndia trial knew nothing of the proceedings either, but " fortuitously"
became aware of the order. By happenstance, an alen V ancouver Sun
reporter also di scovered thal a hearing w hich was somehow linked Lo
Air India was Lak ing place behind closed doors. A s a result of those
developments, the judge who dism issed the constitutional challenge
deli vered a synopsi s of her reasons in open court. She allowed counsel
for the Air India co-accused LO attend Lhe invesLigative hearing, but
prohi bited the lawyers from d isclosing any in formation learned in that
hearing lo Lheir cl ients.

or

If it is accepte d that the o p e n court princ iple nrns t s ometime s y id<l,

the secrecy of lhis process was troubling. The f act that proceedings were
commenced was un known, not only to the publ ic bul also to Lhc accused
stantling trial, w ho had an interesL in what that process disclosed. T hal
a constilulional challenge to section 83.28 had been brought was also

37

38
39

See paras. 68-7 1 (di sc ussing the safety, interests an d right s of wi tnesses and
third parti es), and paras. 72-82 (considering the ri sk lo the proper admini stration of j ustice).
lbid.,at para. 4 1.
T he facts are set out in paras. 5-20 in the j oint maj o ri ty opinion; ibid.
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hidde n from Lhe public. But for lhc doggedness of one reporte r, the
hearing and ils conseque nces for the Air India trial might have re mained
a dark secrel in the criminal justice process.
It is appare nt that at. least some members of the Court were taken
aback by this c hain of events. In the constitut ional challenge to section
83.28, two of seven members of the panel were prepared to declare the
provision unconstitutional and a third, Binnie J. , expressed his outrage
over what he regarded as a serious a buse of process. 40 In Vancouver Sun,
Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. refrained fro m criticizing the lower court
judges but made it plain that "the present fac ts clearly illustrate the
mischief Lhat flows from a presumption of secrecy".41 The proble m was
that " ls]ecrecy Lhen becomes Lhe norm, is applied across the board, and
seal ing orders fo llow as a mauer of course". 42 As they explained, the
" unfolding of events" in Vancouver Sun and the seclion 83.28 case also
illustrates "how antithetical to judicial process secret hearings are". 4 .l
If Lhe i nv~ti gative nature of the process counselled against the full
rigour of the ope n court principle, the e xte nuating circumsta nces of this
hearing and the public distrust the process could so easily breed may
have been fac tors in the Court's decision to place section 83.28 under
its strictures. By requiring the governme nt to satisfy the Dagenais/
M en1uck test or else hold section 83 .28 hearings in public, the Court
placed a substa mial burde n on the provision's use. W ilhout striking it
down, the Court made it more di fficult for the governme nt to conduct
investigative hearings into tem>rist activities. The question that divided
the majority and minority opinions was whethe r the Maclnt.yre rationales
per mitted a presumption of covertness in the case of section 83 .28's
investigative hearing, or whether the compe ting interests at stake rnuld
be adequately protected under a presumption of openness, with covertness as the fallback position, under the Dagenais/Mentuck lest. To the
extent the government cannot effecti vely conduct investigative hearings
unde r a presumption of ope nness, Vancouver Sun may have effectively
rende red it unavailable.

40

41
42
43

LeBe l and Fish dissented and wo uld have declared s .83.28 invalid; Binnie J.
would have upheld the provision but found its use in these circumstances to
be a n abuse of process. As he stated, " the s.83.28 order in this case was sought
by the Cro wn for an inappropriate purpose, it was g ranted on inappropriate
terms, and its i mpropricty was no t cured"; supra, note 5,at para. I I I.
Vancouver Sun , supra, note I, al para.SO.
Ibid.
lbid. ,al para. 52.
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What emerges fro m Vancouver Sun is a commitment lo open ju:stice
and lo lhe standards of governance that arc necessary lo protect that
principle. IL may he that the circumstance::; :surrounding Lhc Air India
section 83.28 application made i t easy for the Court to impose a const itutional requirement o f transparency. Yet the government claimed Lhal
covertness w as required and the Courl' s rej ection of the claim revealed
its commilment to open justice and to secti on 2(b). That is why Vancouver Sun stands as an example of principled decision making.

3. HARPER V. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL)

(a) The Contextual Approach: Not a section 2(b) Success Story
Though the Supreme Court did not apply the contextual approach
in terms, Harper v. Canada (Auorney Gen.emf) is of thal tradition in the
section 2(b) jurisprudence. 44 T hat approach, which dominated decision
making in Lhe 1990s, was based on the following contradiction. On one
hand, according to Irwin Toy l td. c. Quebec ( Procureur general), freedom or expression is based on a principle of content ne utrality. 4 ~ ln other
words, all expressive activity - whether offensi ve or not and whether
valuable or not - is protected by section 2(b) of the Charter. On the
other hand, the content of expression can and should be trea ted differently under section 1.4 ''
The suggestion that not all expressi ve acti vi ties are equal first found
voice in the proposal to apply a contextual approach in balancing values
under section I .47 Before long that innovation added a step to the Oakes
test which allowed the judges to assess the relati ve value of expression.48
S upra , note 2.
(sub nom. Irwin Toy Ltd. 11. Quebec (Attomey General)) I I989J I R.C.S. 927,
1989 CarswelJQuc I I SF, 1989 CarsweJJQuc 115, 94 N.R. 167, 58 D.L.R. (4e)
577, 24 Q.A.C. 2, 25 C.P.R. (3e) 4 17, 39 C.R.R. 193 (S.C.C.).
46 See l?ocket v. Royal College of De111a/ Surgeons (Ontario) , 119901 2 S.C.R.
232, 1990 CarswellOnt IO14, 1990 Ca1s wellOn1 10 I 4F, (sub nom. Royal
College of Dental Surgeons (Ontario) v. Rocket) 11 1 N.R. 161 , 7 1 D.L.R. (4lh)
68, 47 C.R. R. 193, (sub nom. Royal College of Dental Surgeons (Onwrio) v.
t<ocket) 40 0.A.C. 24 1, 73 O.R. (2d) 128 (note) (S.C.C.) (stating that not all
infringements o f section 2(b) are equall y serious and that some are easier to
justi fy than othe rs).
47 Edmonton Jottmaf, supra, note 10.
48 See R. v. Keegsrra ( 1990), [ 1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 1990 Carswt:l l AILa 192, 1990
CarswcllAlta 66 1, I C.R. (4th) 129, 77 Alla. L.R. (2d) 193, 117 N.R . 1, [ 199 1J
2 W.W.R. I, 114 A.R. 81, 6 1 C.C.C. (3d) I, 3 C.R.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.C.).
44
45
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"Core values" analysis was a device lhat enabled the Court to attenuate
the standard of justification when it deemed the content of a message lo
be of low value. In function and result, the contextual approach's values
analysis legitimized the kinds of content distinctions s. 2(b )' s neutrality
principle was designed to avoid.
In turn this me thodology produced a generatio n of decisions which
upheld a variety of restric tions on " low value" expressio n. 49 In e ffect,
the core-values analysis saved limits on e xpressive activ ity whenever
49

A lis1 o f cases that re lied on 1he low value of the message to uphold limits
under section I incl udes R. v. Keegstra, Ibid. ; Canada (Human Rights Co111111ission) v. Taylor, 19901 3 S.C.R. 892, 1990 Carswell Nat 742, 1990
Carswel lNat 1030, [19901 S.C.J. No. 129, 75 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 3 C.R.R. (2d)
116, (sub nom. Taylor v. Canada (Hwmm Righ.1s Commission)) 11 7 N .R. 191,
13 C.H.R.R. D/435 (S.C.C.); R. v. Butler, Ll 992] I S.C.R. 452, 1992
CarswellMan 100, 1992 CarswellMan 220, [ 1992) 2 W.W.R. 577, 11 C.R.
(4th) 137, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 129, 134 N.R. 8 1, 8 C.R.R. (2d) I , 89 D.L.R. (4th)
449, 78 Man. R. (2d) I, 16 W ./\.C. I (S.C.C.), reconsidera1 ion re fused [ 1993]
2 W.W .R. lxi (S.C.C.); Allis v. New Brunswick District No. 15 Board of
J::ducation. (sub nom. Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15) [ I 996J
I S.C.R . 825, 1996 CarswellNB 125, 1996 CarswellN B 125F, [1996) S.C.J.
No. 40, (sub nom. Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15) 133 D.L.R.
(4th) I , 195 N.R. 8 1, 37 Adm in. L.R. (2d) 13 1, (sub 110111. Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15) 25 C.H.R.R. DI 175, (sub no m. Auis v. Board of
School Trustees, District No. 15) 35 C.R.R. (2d) I, 437 A.P.R. 32 1, (suh nom.
Anis v. Board of School Trustees, District No. 15) 96 C.L.L.C. 230-020, 17 1
N.B.R. (2d) 32 1 (S.C.C.); imd R. v. Lucas ( 1998), [ 1998] I S.C.R. 439, 1998
CarswellSask 93, 1998 Cars wellSask 94, 224 N.R. 16 1, 123 C.C.C. (3d) 97,
157D.L.R.(4th) 423.50C.R.R.(2d)69. 163Sask.R.16 1, 165W.A.C.1 6 1.
14 C.R. (5th) 237, f 1999'1 4 W.W .R. 589, 5 B.H.R.C. 409 (S.C.C.); see also R.
v. Zundel, [ 19921 2 S.C.R. 73 1, 1992CarswellOnt 109, 1992Carswell0nt 995,
16 C.R. (4th) I , 75 C.C.C. (3d)449, 10 C.R.R. (2d) 193, (sub nom. R. v. Zundel
(No. 2)) 56 0.A.C. 161 , (sub nom. R. v. Zundel (No. 2)) 140 N.R . I, 95 D.L. R.
(4th) 202 (S.C.C.); !UR-Macdonald Inc. c. Canada (Procureur general) , (sub
nom. RJR-MacD011ald Inc. v. Canada (Auomey General)) (1995] 3 R.C.S.
199, 1995 CarswellQue I 19, 1995 CarswellQue I 19F, [1995] S.C.J. No. 68,
(s ub nom. R.IR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Auorney General)) 127 D.L.R.
(4c) I, (sub 110111. RJR-MacD011ald fnc. v. Canadtz (A11orney General)) 100
C.C.C. (3e) 449, (sub nom. R.IR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Allorney General)) 62C.P. R. (3e) 417, (sub nom. IUR-MacD011ald Inc. v. Canada (A11oruey
General)) 3 1 C.RR. (2e) 189, (sub nom. R.IR-MacDonald Inc. c. Canada
(Procureur general)) 187 N.R. l (C.S.C.); and R. v. Slw rpe, 1200 1) I S.C.R .
45, 2001CarswellBC82, 200 I Carswell BC83, [200 1] S.C.J. No. 3, 200 1 SCC
2 , 194 D.L.R. (4th ) I, 150 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 39 C.R . (5th) 72, 264 N.R. 20 1,
146B.C.A.C.16 1, 239W.A.C. 16 1,88B.C.L. R.(3d) 1,[20011 6 W.W.R. I,
86 C .R.R. (2d) I (S.C.C .) (dissenting opinions).

r

GOVERNANCE AND A NARCHY INS. 2(b) JURISPRUDENCE

85

the Courl found that Lhe content or the message had lilllc or no value.
One difficulty was !hat this approach conflated the concepts of value
and harm: it assumed that expression w hich has liule or no value i s also
harmful, w hether or nol a harm independent of its percei ved value could
be shown. A l the same time, an approach thal limited expressi ve activity
which was valueless but not harmful rendered the pri nciple of content
neutrality a ll but meaningless. As long as that methodology preva iled,
the prospects for section 2(b) and the principle of content nculralily
remained dim. 511 Moreover, the contextual approach could not be considered a model of governance, because il invoked an abslracl and ideal
conception
expression to undermine the freedom in particular cases,
il addcJ '\:ontexl" Lo the Oakes test as a way
diluting the standard of
j ustificat ion under section I , and it allowed the Court to uphold Ii mi ts
on expression that was perceived as valueless but not proven, by evidence, to be harmful.
More rccenlly, !he Court has dow nplayed !he role of the contextual
approach in section 2(b).51 If it is unforlunale that the Court has not
invalidaled a legislaLive restriction on expressive freedom since Thomson Newspapers Co. V. Canada (Allorney Geneml), !he decline or !he
contextual approach has heen encouraging . ~2 Its drop in doctrinal stallls
suggested thal the Court had begun to separate the concepts or val ue
and harm in determining the permissibility of contcn!-based distinctions.
This was a welcome dcvelopmenl, because expression is not constitutionally protected because a gi ven message is necessarily valuable, hut
rather because freedom prevails unless there is evidence that its content
is harmful. Placing the focus under section I on the evidence
harm is
more consistent with the principle o f content neutrality and the underlying values of section 2(b).
In hindsi ght, the contextual approach had two redeeming 4ual i ties.
Firsl, though m isdirected, the Court was forthright enough during the

or

or

or

1990s lo explu i n l hnl the consl.ilulionul status o f ex pressio n <lcpen<led

on the value of the message. This the majority opinion in Ha rper did
nol or could not do. Second, the contextual approach did not deter the

50
51

52

For a critique of the contextual approach, see J. Cameron, "The Past, Present
and 1-'ulure of Expressive Freedom Under the Charter", ( 1997), 35 0.H.L.J. I.
Lucas, supra, note 49 may have Ileen the last time a 1rnijority opinion was
explicitly based on this analysis.

Ll9981 I S.C.R. 877, Ll998l S.C.J. No. 44, 1998 CcirswellOnt 198 1, 1998

CarswellOnt 1982, 159 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 226 N.R. I, 5 I C.R. R. (2cl) I 89, 38
O.R. (3d) 735 (headnote only), 109 0.A.C. 201, 5 B.11.R.C. 567 (S.C.C.).
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Court from prolecling unpo pular or controversial expressive aclivity
when seelion I' s require ments were nol met. For instance, despite a
rising tide against smoking, tobacco companies and advertising, a maj ority he ld in RJR-Macdonald Inc. that Parliament's ban on tobacco
advertising unjustifiably violated freedom of cx prcss ion. 5~ Another example is Libman c. Quebec (Procureur general), whic h invalidated
lim its on thi rd party spending under the minima l impairme nt analysis,
despite the Court's conc lusio n tha t suc h limits are justifiable in principlc.54 A third is T homson Newspapers, which applied a principled section I a nalysis and is an example of governance for that reason. 55 The
contextual approac h may be in remission al present, but that does not
mean that the Court's decisions are g rounded in princ iple.
Only days be fore Prime Minister Martin called a federa l e lection in
May 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada issued one of its mosl important
j udgments on expressive freedom in Harper v. Canad.c1 (Attorney Generul).5" The re , the Coufl upheld the Canada Election Act's lim its on
third party advertising during federal eleccion campaigns:57 Parliame nt's
restrictio ns ta rgeted the status of the speaker, as a third party or citizen
participant, rather than the content of the expression. Nor did the Coun
rely on the contextua l approach to uphold the reslrictions; participation
in a de mocratic e lection is at the core of section 2(b) and it wou ld have
been awkward lo dilute sectio n I on a "core- values" analysis. Instead,
when it found the m inconvenie nt, t.he majority opinion simply defl ected
sectio n I's evidentiary requirements. As Harper shows, the result of an
ad hoc approach to section I and its evide ntiary requirements is methodological anarchy . The po int is reinforced by the Court's pre-Harper
decis ions on panic ipalion in the de mocratic process .~ij

53

54

StqJra , note 49.
[ 1997) 3 R.C.S. 569, 1997 Carswe llQue 85 1, 1997 CarswcllQue 852, [1997.1
S .C.J. No. 85, (sub nom. Libman v. Quebec (A//om ey General)) 151 D.L.R.
(4e) 385, (sub nom. Libman v. Quebec (A1tom ey General)) 46 C.R.R. (2e)
234. 3 B.H.R.C. 269 (S.C.C.).

55 Supra, note 52.
56 Supra, note 2. McL achlin C.J. and M ajor J. wrote a joint dissent, in which
57

58

Binnie J. concurred.
Suvra, note 3.
Compare Hw1>er v. Canada with Thomson Newspapers, ibid., and Figueroa
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] I S.C. R. 91 2, 12003 i S.C.J. No. 37,

2003 CarswellOnt 2462, 2003 CarswellOnt 2463, 176 0.A.C. 89, 108 C.R.R.
(2d ) 66, 2003 sec 37, 227 D.L.R. (4th) I, 306 N.R. 70 (S.C.C.).
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(b) Elections and the Contest Between Equality and Participation
Restrictions on third party advertisi ng were l itigated under earlier
statutory provisions, and though the legislation was ded ared invalid on
two occasions prior to Harper v. Canada (Allorney General), neither

case reached the Supreme CourL of Canada.59 ln Lhc fall of 2000, Harper
l stayed an inj unction against application of the Canada Hlection Act's
spendi ng limits .<~) W ith M ajor J. dissenting, the Courl concluded that the
tialance favoured enforci ng legislation which might tic round unconstitutional over staying i ts enforcement Lo protect the exerc ise or section
2(ti) rights during an election campaign. Harper returned to the Court
for decision on the merits afler the Alberta Court of Appeal invalidated
the challenged provisions.<•1
Though the constitutional ity of limits under.federal legislation was
a matter of first impression for the Coun in Harper 11, the status o f third
party advertising was not. I n 1997 Libman c. Quebec ( Procureur
neral) held that provincial legislation which effectively banned th ird

xe-

Sec National Ci1ize11s' Coali1io11 lnc./Coali1io11 11atio11ale des citoye11s Inc. v.
Callada (Auom ey General), 11 D.L.R. (4th) 48 1, 1984 CarswellAlta 87, 32
Alta. L.R . (2d) 249, L19841SW.W.R. 436, 14 C.R.R.6 1 (Alta. Q.B.) (declaring
a prohihirio n on thi rd party spending unconstitutional), and Canada (A11orney
Ge11eral) v. Somerville. 136 D.L.R. (4th) 205. 1996 Carswell Alta 503. 39 A lta.
L.R. (3d) 326, 37 C.R.R. (2d) 24, 1'199618 W.W.R. 199. 184 A.R. 241, 122
W .A.C. 24 1 (Alta. C.A.) (inva lidating legislative restrictions o n third party
spending).
60 Harper v. Ca11ada (Artom ey Ge11eral) (2000), [2000) 2 S.C.R. 764, 2000
CarswellAlta 11 58, 2000 CarswellA lta 1159, [2000J S.C.J. No. 58, 2000 SCC
57, 193 D.L.R. (4th) 38, 27 1 A .R . 201 , 234 W.A.C. 201 , L200 11 9 W .W .R .
20 I, 92 A lta. L.R. (3d) I (S.C.C.).
6 1 266 AR. 262, 2000 CarswellAlta 1198, [2000] A .J. No. 1240, 2000 ABCA
288, 228 W .A. C. 262 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed (2000). 2000
C urswcllAlt n 1287. 2000 CarswellAlta 1288. 262 N.R. 201 (S.C.C.). T he
majority opinion roun d " no persuasive evidence" that the pro blems which are
associated with campaign tinancing in Am erican politics have arisen in Canada; ibid. , at para 115. The Court also complai ncd that, instead of presenting
fresh evidence, th e government was content to recycle out of date information
from the Lo1tie Report. Consequently, a majority concluded that the government had foiled to establish the potential harm, and held that controlling third
pa11y spending was not even a pressing and substantial concern under the first
past o f Oakes. Ibid., at para. 134. In addition, the appellate court found that the
legislatio n failed the proportionality test because the scheme's $3000 l imit
rendered even mi11i111ally effective third pany adverti si ng " nugatory"; in its
view a provision that "so restri cts freedom o f expression to make it ine ffectual
is equivalent to an absolute ban". Ibid. , at para. 176.
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party participation in a referendum setting was unconstilutionaJ.<'2 D espite that resull, the Court's unanimous opinion rel ied heavil y on the
Lortie Commission Report,6~ expressl y disagreed with the Alberta Court
of Appeal's decision in Canada (Allorney General) v. Somerville,M and
recognized that "spending limits arc essential to ensure the primacy of
the principle of fairness in democratic elections".<'~ Not only did Libman
find such limits permissible, it indicated that they are posi ti vely desirable
as well.
The L ortie Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing
was charged Lo look at a number of issues relating 10 the electoral system
and campaign finances, including the role of third party advertising, was
one such issue. On that question the Commi ssi on was strongly of the
v iew that limits on participation are vital to the integrity and fairness of
the electoral process. In part, that v iew rested on the conclusion that it
would be impossible to control party spending i f third party advertising
was nOl regu lated. Significantly, though, the Commission also treated
third parties as outsiders who should be held to a nominal role in election
campai gns. The Commission thought that their participation would tilt
the play ing field, skew the process <inc.I pose a disrnpli vc prcsc111;c in
elecLion debate.66 Inevitabl y, some voices would become too powerful
and others would be drowned out
Libman c. Quebec (Procureur general) agreed wi th those conclusions. Specifically, the Court found that Quebec's restrictions on referendum adve1tising were " highly laudable": the Ii mi rs would prevenl "the
most affluent members of soc iety from exerting a disproportionate influence by dominating the referendum debate through access to greater
resources"; t:he limits would ensure that some positions are not "buried
by others"and permit an " informed choice" by voters; moreover, by
preventing the process from being "dominated by the power of money" ,

62

63
64
65
66

Supra, note 56. Sec C. Fcasby, "Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) And the Administration o f the Process of Democracy under the Charter: The Emerging Egalitarian M odel" ( 1999), 44 M cGill LJ. 5.
Sec Royal Co111111issio11 011 Electoral Reform and Party Financing ( the " L orti e
Repo1t") (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 199 1) .
Supra, note 59.
Lih111a11 , supra, note 56, al 598 (citing the Lortie Commission).
Ir would he disrupti ve in two ways: first it wou ld undercutthe political equality
of citizens because those with wealth could monnpolize the discourse and
attain greater influence than those less aflluent; and second, third parly participation would create advantages and disadvantages for the candidates and their
parties that would affect the fairness of' elections.
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limits would " preserve the con fidence of the electorate in the electoral

process".67
At lhe same time, 's support for spending limi ls con llictcd with the
Alberta Court of Appeal's decision in Canada (Allorney General) v.
Somerville, which had invalidated Parliament' s earlier restrictions on
third party advcrtising.<.i< The federal government d id not seek leave lo
appeal and Somerville never came before the Court. T hough it had no
access LO the record and evidence, or lO submissions from counsel , the
Court's unanimous opinion simply declared in Libman that ' 'we cannot
accept the A lberta Court of Appeal' s point of view because we disagree
with its conclusion" .69
The Cou rt invalidated Quebec' s referendum spending lim its i n any
case because the restrictions effectivel y placed a toLal ban on third party
participation .70 In strik ing the legislation, it suggested that a li mit sim ilar
to that recommended hy the Lortie Commission would he "far less
intrusive" of expressive frecdom.7 1 W i thout endorsing the Commission ' s recommendation, which proposed a $ 1,()()() maximum, the Court
indicated that the amount allowed would " have Lo he fair whi le being
small enough to be consistent with the objecti ves of the Act".72
The federal government responded w ith new provisions that reseL
the th ird party limit on spending in parliamentary elections al $30(X) per
const ituency and $ 150,000 nationally. Jn light of Libman the question
in Harper II was whether that l imit was generous enough to survive
review under section I . The Alberta Court or Appeal once again answered that question in the negati ve.n Meanwhile, the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence had evol ved.
After supporting its position on third party limi ts in Libnum, a
majority of the Court in Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney
General) disagreed with the L ortie Commission and struck Parliament's
ban on opinion polls in the final 72 hours of an election campaign. 7~ A s

67

Ibid. (emphasi s added).

68

Supra, note 59
Libman, supra, note 56, at 61 9.
U nder the Special Version uf the Elec:tiun Act applicable lo the referendum
process, third party spending was limited, under S<x;tio11 404, lo u maxi mum
of $600, w hich could be applied to the organization or ho lding of a meeti ng.
Supra, note 56, at 6 19-20.

69

70

71
72

73
74

Ibid.

Supra, note 6 1.
T hough Lhe Lortie Commission reco mmended a 48 hour blackout, the legislative p1·ovisio n co nsidered by lhc Court in Tlro111so11 Newspapers established
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with chird party spending limits, the a rgume nt for a blackout was thac
suc h polls might undul y influe nce voters and distort election results.
Agai nst a strong dissent by Gonthier J., Bastarache J. re lied on sound
methodology to ex plain his reasons for striking the limit. 75
After carefully considering the evidence, he held that "lt]he very
serious invasion of the freedo m o f ex pressio n of all Canadians is not
o utweighed by the speculative and marginal be ne fits postulated by the
government". 76 In doing so he refused to accept that voters require<l
Parliament's inte rventio n to protect them from informa tion which might
corrupt the ir ballot decision. To the contrary, he asserted that vote rs
have " the rig ht ro consider the resulls of polls as pan of a strategic
exercise oftheir vote". 17 Bastarache J. a lso scoffed at the suggestion that
in doing so ci tizens would be "so naive as to forget the issues and interests
which motivate them to vote for a particular candidate". '~ He claimed
that it was impossible, "witho ut gravely insulting the Canadian voter",
to accept that " there is any like lihood that an individual would he so
enthralled by a particular poll result as to allow his or her e lectoral
judg ment to be ruled by it".79
His majority opinio n also considered the relative value and harm of
opinion polls in some detail. On that point Bastarache J. stated that "lt]hc
possibility of harm aris ing fro m the unfortuicous publicatio n of an inaccurate poll does not replace the general na1ure of this expression at
the core of s.2(b)".x0 Despite the possibility that some voters mig ht be
mis led by these polls, he rejected the suggestion that the harm warranted
a "significant level of deference lo the government in fashioning means
which trespass on the freedom of expression".x 1 As he explai ned, "little
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a 72 hour backoul; s upra, note 2 1.
In dissent, Gonthier J. maintained that " lbleing themselves the very o bjects of
elect.ions, members of Parliarnc nl were in lhe best posi1ion to assess the effects
o f polls in electoral campaigns and their impact on indi vidual voters"; ibid.• at
908. Following a review of the evidence he concluded that opinion polls have
a significant influence and are subject to "error, misrepresentation and tare]
open to manipulation" ibid., al 925. In such circumstances it. was justifiable
for Parliament to draw a distinction betw een voter access to any and all informati on, including poo r information, and voter access to good information,
including timely information. Ibid., at 908 amt 923.
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Ibid., al 973.
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dcfcrcm:c shoullJ be shown in Lhis case where the contextual facLOrs
indicate that the government has not established thal the harm which i t
is seeking LO prevent is widespread or significanl".x 2
Bastarac he J. found no ev idence that voters suffered from any misapprehension regarding the accuracy of a single poll.83 To that he added
that the government's claims of w idespread or significant harm were
not compelling. fn fact he responded harshl y lO the govcrnmcm 's aucmpl
to justify the ban "on the basis I hat some indeterminate number o f voters
might be unable Lo spot an inaccurate poll result and might rely Lo a
significant degree on the error ... "M . Jn striking down the opinion poll
blackout, Bastarache J. gave section 2(b)' s underly ing values and section
I 's cvidcntiary requirements r igourous and disciplined attention. Notably, Thomson Newspapers was the firs t Supreme Court decision under
section 2(h) to break ranks wi th the di lution of section I analysis under
the contextual approach during this period. It provided a model of governance of section 2(b) adjudication outside the open j ustice context
In addit ion lO Thomson Newspapers and its ev idence-based section
2(b) methodology, the Supreme Court establ ished a right to participate
in the democratic process in Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General).85
I n doing so, Figueroa created potential conllict between the principle
of meaningful partic ipation and Libman's support for third party spending limits. There, the challenge was aimed at provisions in the Canada
Elections Act which made the statutory benefits and enti tlements that
are available to political parties subject to a 50 candidate minimum.
Though it did not interfere with any cili'l-en's right lo vole, the minimum
disadvantaged smaller parties that could not field that many <.:andidates.
Parties unable Lo <.:ross that threshold cou ld not be registered, were not
eligible to issue iax receipcs, LO transfer unused election funds LO the
party, or to have their party affiliation listed on the ballot. ~"
Section 3 of the Charter protects the rights o f citizens, not of candi<latcs for offi<:c and thei r politi<:al pa rt ics.x? In the <:i rc umslanccs, the

Court could only find a breach of the guarantee by conclud ing that
Pad iamcnt' s requirements for party status infringed Lhe individual rights
82
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Ibid. , a l 963 (emphasis added).
Ibid., at 956.
Ibid. , a l 97 I (emphasis added).
Supru, note 58.
Canada Elec1io11s Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.E-2, ss.24(2), 24(3), and 28(2).
This guaramee provides: " Every citizen of Canada has the ri ght to vote.: in an
election or rneml)ers or the House uf Commons or or a legislative assembly
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of Canadian voters. In the course or invalidating provisions that excluded
the Communisl Party from statulory benefits, Iacobucci J. created an
individual right to play a meaningful role in the democratic process.
H is majority opinion began from the proposition that section 3
guarantees the righl "Lo a certain level of pai1icipation in the electoral
process".xx I acobucci J. expanded on the concept of participation by
describing i t as the right " l o express an opinion about the forma tion of
social policy and the functioning of publit: inslilutions through partici pation in the electoral proccss"."9 He added that i f the sovereign power
in a democracy resides in "the people as a whole", each citi zen "musl
have a genuine opportunity to take part in the governance of the country
through participation in Lhe selection of elected representativcs".9(1 "Abscnl such a right", he concluded, "ours wou Id not be a true democracy" .~»
For those reasons, participation under his conception of democrac y has

an intrinsic value independent <~{its impact upon the actual outcome of
elections".92
Figueroa found Lhat the 50 candidalc minimum disadvantaged the
Communisl Party in ways that would deny ciLi zens access lo that Party's
ideas. As such, Lhc legislalion infringed the righL of voLers to "play a
meaningfu l role in the electoral process".''~ Specifically, Parliament's
exclusionary threshold compromised voter parlicipation because prov isions that disadvantaged smaller panics augmente<l existing disparities
and enabled the " most affluent parties" to dominate the public discourse,
thereby depri ving their opponenls of a reasonable opportun ity to speak
and to be heardY4 In other words, the 50 candidate minimum exacerbated
a pre-existing disparity in the capacity of d isadvantaged political parties
to imroducc their ideas to the open dialogue of the electoral process.
T he problem wi th Parliament' s scheme was that it enabled the established parties to retain their advantages of size and opportunity. The
voices of smaller parties would be drowned out under such a scheme.95
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A s I acobucci J. explained: ''the already m arginalized voi ces o f political parties
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Figueroa held signillcance for Harper II because spending limits
have a greater, and more immediate impact on participation in the democratic process. The reason is LhaLrestrictions on third party participation
effectivel y gran t the political parties and their candidates a monopoly
on debate during an election campaign. Provisions which limit third
patties to nominal spending unavoidably exacerbate the ex isting dispari ties between party and non-party participants. Moreover, the acknowledged purpose of such limi1s is that 10 limit the role of third parties in
the electoral process.
Seemingly, Ha rper v. Canada (A11orneyGenera/) required the Court
to choose between Ubman's egali tarian model and Figueroa 's principle
of meaningful participation. Under the Libman-Lonie view, elections
arc a process in which candidates and their parties arc the acti ve participants. T hat conception allows voters and third parties to exerc ise nominal rights or pa1ticipation but otherwise relega tes them lo status as
passi ve observers. The only forms of participation open to them are the
right to vote, which is guaranteed by section 3 or the Charter, and the
right to exercise their section 2(b) rights by maki ng donat ions to the
candidates or their polit ical parties. Beyond the small allowance permitted in recent years by stalute, individuals and groups are not allowed
to participate in their own voice.
The dilemma for the Court was that Figueroa's principle of meaningful participation could not be easi ly reconciled with Ubman's egalitarian rationale. U nder the Libman-L ortie concept of electoral fairness,
all third parties arc formally equal: the process treats them the same way
by effectively excluding them individually and as a collective of c itizenpartic ipanls from playing a role in election <lebate. That concept ion of
fairness focuses almost exclusi ve attention on the interests of political
parties and their candidates. Libman made it clear in the statement that
third party participation should be limited because " Ii Independent
spending coulJ very wel l have the effect of directly or indirectl y pro-

moting one candidate or political party to the detriment of the others".96
Despite acknowledging that thi rd parties contribute to the debate in
valuable ways, the Court concluded that their participation can be limited
because "it is the candidates and political parties that are running for
e/ection".91 Third parties may be equal Lo each other in the system but
equal, under that conception of participation, means discntitlcd.

96 Supra,
97

rlOlC

56 <\ l 600.

Ibid. , at 60 I (emphasis added).
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(c) The Egalitarian Model and the Equal Right Not to Participate
T hough Bastarache J. acknowledged that Harper JI provided the
first opportunity for the Court to consider third party spending limits,
his interpretation of Libman c. Quebec ( Procureur general) made it
impossible for the challenge to succeed.9x He deflecced Thomson Newspapers and Figueroa by circu lar rea">oning which rested on the following
logic. First he noted that Libman's concept of electoral fairness was
consistent with the egalitarian model adopted by Parliament.w Then he
observed that the C.£.A. 's third party limits constituted a response to
Libman. The resul t was insti tuti onal accord: Libman's endorsement of
limits was consistent with the government' s conception of electoral
fairness, and the government's response to Libman was consi stent wi th
the Court's conception of electoral fairness. Once Bastarache J. round
that Parliament and the Court agreed on the merits of the egalitarian
model. the C.E.A. 's spendi ng limits became unassailable.
T he Court's majority opinion also asked the wrong question to
enhance Libman's status at the expense of Thomson Newspapers and
Figueroa. T he issue in Harper II was not wheLher Lhe Court an<.I Parliament agree that the right to participate should be limited to promote an
egalitarian model. The Charter docs not ask the Court Lo place its insticutional weight on one side of that question or the OLher. The issue instead
was whether the government could demonstrate that the risks associ ated
with third party spending were suffici ent to justi fy an egal i tarian model
Lhat devalued rights of participation that are protected by section 2(b).
In the circumstances, Figueroa's principle of meaningful participation posed an obstadc which had Lo be explained away. To avoid Lhe
force of facohucci J. 's uninh ihiled language, B astarache J. declared that
Figueroa did not apply in Harper because section 3's rights of partici pation cannot he claimed under section 2(b). Yet if the statutory prov isions that disadvantaged smaller parti es comprom ised the rights of voters in Figueroa, it would he impossible for limits which directl y prohibit
individuals from playing a role in election debate not LO constitute a
more serious interference wi th rights protected hy section 2(b)'s guarantee of expressive freedom.
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[n refu sing lo extend Figueroa's logic to section 2(b), Bastarache J.
suggested that third party adverlising is inconsistent wi th section J's
concept of meaningful participation because " the unequal dissemination
of points of view underm ines the voter's abi lity Lo be adequately informed
all views". HMi Though it was not substantiated, his posi tion
was that information does not ass ist, but interferes wi th, the freedom of
an informed voter. The loosely connected logic of that argument is that
voters can only be informed when voices arc equal, and that third pany
invol vement undercuts the informed and therefore meaningful participation of voters. In making that argument B astarache J. assumed that
the voter's perception would be clouded by too much information from
d iverse and unequal sources. Yet Harper's protectionist geslures in this
context recal l Gonthier J.'s willingness in Thomson Newspapers to protect voters from poor poll ing i nformation which might d istract and
confuse them in similar ways. There, however, Bastarache J. had retorted
that "the Canadian voter is a ra tional actor who can learn from experience
and make independent judgments aboul lhc value of parlicular sources
or electoral information" .1111
Bastarache J.conceded that spending limiLs which arc overly restrictive can undermine the informational componenl of section 3, but added
that meaningful participation does nol include lhe rreedom lo conducl a
campaign thal might determine the oulcome. 1112 This also contradicts
Figueroa, which held that parlicipalion has an intrinsic va lue independent of its impact on the election outcome. w~ The issue in Harper was
not whclhcr lhird parties have a constitutional right to determine the
outcome of an election; the question was whether they have a right lo
participate, whether their impacl is small or large. Ycl the majority
opinion drove a wedge between the volcr' s section 3 rights and section
2(b)'s guaramee of expressi ve freedom. U nder that view, third party
participation erodes rather than promotes mean ing fu l participation under
section 3. Put diffe re ntly, democratic pa rticipation under section 2(h) is
ini mical to the interests of voters. W hatever the merits of that view,
Bastarache J. st ill failed lo explain why section 3's guarantee is paramount over section 2(b), either in principle or in this conlcxl.
His majority opinion also rendered the evidence meaningless hy
insisting that the Court was required to choose between the egalitarian

or
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model and unlimited righLs of participalion. Thus he maintained that
those who have access to the most resources will monopolize the election
di scourse and undermine the voter ' s ability Lo be adequatel y informed
of all vicws. 104 This observation supported the conclusion that section 3
docs not guarantee a right to unlimited information or unlimited participati on.105 But Harper did not force the Court to choose between a $3,000
l imi t and no limit whatsoever. By referring throughout the opinion to
the problem of " unlimited third party advertising", Bastarache J. framed
the anal ysis as though there were only two choices. '°6 The question
before the Court was not whether restricti ons on third party adve11ising
are per se unconstitutional but whether the particular limit chosen by
Parliament - $3,000 per electoral district and $ 150,000 nationally - was
justifiable under section 1.
In answer to that question and in contrast to the methodology he
applied in Thomson Newspapers, Bastarache J. brushed quickl y over
discussion the expressive activity at stake, noling only that third party
adverti sing enriches the political discourse and lies at che core section
2(b)_un Though he had li ttle choice but to concede lhe point, his reasons
make it clear Lhat he auached lillle or no value LO the right of Lhird panics
to participate in election debate. Once having accepted thal it would
normally be entitled to a high degree of constitutional protection, Bastarache J. stated that "third party advertising w ill be less deserv ing of
consticucional protection" in some circumsLances. 10i1
Again in contrast to Thomson Newspapers, where he explai ned why
deference was inappropriaLe, Baslarache J. held in Harper that the Court
should defer to Parliament. Third party spending invited that approach,
he said, because Parliament has the right to choose Canada's electoral
model and to address any nuances in its implementation .U19 Without
specifically relying on the con textual approach as it evol ved in the
section 2(b) jurisprudence of the 1990s, he relied on undisclosed " contex tual factors" to support a deferential version of the section I anal y-
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sis. 1 10 Apart from undisguised support for the ega litarian model, it is
unclear which conlexLUal facLOrs invi ted this need for deference.
Once dcfcn.:ncc was in place, Bastarache J . sought lo explain how
Parliament's spending limits cou ld be regarded as reasonable when there
was no evidence that third party participation would harm the electoral
process. There, too, he could not avoid admitting that " rtJhcrc is no
evidence .. . lhal third pany advertising seeks LO be manipulative" .' "
Nor was there evidence that " third patties wish to use their advertising
dollars to smear candidates or engage in other forms of non-political
discourse". 112 In the absence of recent, documented evidence, Bastarache
J. reprimanded the lower courts for discounting the L ortie Report, w hich
he touted as the "central piece in the cv identiary record establishing the
possible harm engendered by uncontrolled third party advenising". 11 ~
At hest, he was able to say that without limits, electoral fairness is "a
real possibility". 11 4
The moment of truth in the majority opinion is found in the statement
that shirely, Parliament does nol have to wai t for the feared harm to
occur before it can enact measures to prevenl the posshility of harm
occurring or to remedy the harm, should it occur.""~ In hlunt terms, this
means that the evidence docs not matter, and that limits on constitutional
rights arc rcasonahle and j ustifiable whether or not the government can
show that exercising of the right poses an articulated or articulable harm.
It is a remarkable statement at large, and one that is as worrying as ii is
surprising in this context. Hwper If is yet more extraordinary against
the background of the Thomson Newspapers methodology and Figueroa's principle of meaningful participation. It is as transparent as it is
inescapable that the majority opinion is an example of result-based
decision making. B astarache }. could not uphold the limit on third pa rty
spendi ng without ignoring the Court's decisions on participation, and
ahandoni ng the methodology of Thomson Newspapers and other section
2(b) ca~cs .
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(d) Participation and the Equal Voice of Each C itizen
The majori Ly opinio n's unmasked supporl for the egalitaria n model,
in combination with its lack of respect for an evidence-based methodology under sectio n I , invited dissent. T he Chief Justice and Major J.
obl iged hy writinga joint minority o pinion, in which BinnicJ. conc urred.
They maintained thal it was not necessary to c hoose between and Figueroa, because Parliament's spending limits were unconstitutional for
lhe same reasons Que bec's sche me had been invalidated. As they explained, "the incursio n essentia lly denies free expression and far surpasses what is required lo meet the perceived chreat that c itizen speech
will d rown out other political discourse". 116 In Libman, the Court held
that the restrictions were so severe that they came c lose lo being a total
ban. The Chief Jus ticc and Major J. stated that Harper was indisting uish.able on that poi nt: the situation was "precisely the same" as in Libman,
because "[i]l is not a n exaggerntion to say chat the [CEA 's] limits on
c itizens amount to a vi nual ban o n their partici pation in politica l debate
duri ng the e lectio n period". 117
Unlike Basta rac he J., who barely mentioned it, the joinL dissent
focused on the severity of the violation. To them the meagerness of
Parliament's $3,000 allowance represented a serious incursion on free
expression in the political realm, because it e ffectively denied the right
of an ordinary c itizen to give meaningful and effective expression lo her
political views during a fede ral e lection campaig n. 11 x Pa rliame nt' s provis io ns set advertising limits for c itizens at such low levels tha t they
"cannot effectively communicate w ith the ir fe llow c itizens on e lection
issues during an election campaign". 11 9 As a resu lt, "effecti ve local,
regional and national expression of ideas becomes the exclusive righ1 of
registered poli1ica l parties and their candidates". 120 For them it was
problematic that under Parliamcnl's regime, "the on ly sustained messages voters sec and hear during the course of an e lectio n campaign are
from political parties". 12 1
It is clear that the dissenting judges fou nd tha t result offensive to
democratic values and to the Charter principle that political expression

Ibid., at para 2 (citing Libman).
Ibid. , at para 35.
Ibid., at para. I .
Ibid. , at para 2.
120 Ibid. , al pa1·a 7 (emphasis added).
12 1 Ibid. , at para. 19.
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is " the sing le most imporlant and proleclcd l y pc of exprcssion". 122 Jn
their v iew, it was impermissible for Parliament lo advance or protect the
interests or registered polilical parties at the expense of seclion 2(h),
which guarantees "an equal voice lo each citizen". 123 T he guaranlee
embraces lhc righl of lhe speaker lo communicale w ilh members of the
eleclOrate, as well as l hc right of voters to listen and to have access to
the commentary, perspecti ve, and opinions or fellow citi zens.
Not only did lhe dissent challenge the proposition that third part ics
do not have the same rights of participation as political parties, it rej ected
the majority opinion's conclusion that non-party participation is inimical
10 the rights
voters under section 3. To the contrary, the Chief Justice
and M ajor J. explained that voters have a constitutionally protccled right,
not only under Figueroa but under the section 2(h) jurisprudence as
well, to hear the speaker's message. They regarded the interests
the
section 3 voter and the section 2(h) participants as compatible, not
incompatible, as the majority opinion conlendcd. Moreover, they said it
was no answer to spending limits that citizens remain free to speak
through a registered political party. Citizens are entitled to communicate
with fcl low volers dircclly, and the r ighl lo do so is "essential to the
effective dcbale upon which our democracy rests, and lies at the core of
the free expression guarantee". 124 For those reasons, the dissenting
j udges r~jccted deference and stated that limits on such a fund amental
right must be supported by "a clear and convincing demonstra1ion that
they arc necessary, do not go too far, and enhance more than harm the
dcmocral ic process". 125
Under section I, the Chief Justice and Major J. admonished the
federal government for failing to adduce evidence that third patty spending is harmful; as they explained, 1hc Attorney General had not shown
"any real problem requiring rectification". 12'' Instead, and in the absence
of evidence that wealthier Canadians would dominate debate, "ltlhe
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Jangc rs posilc<l I were] w ho lly h y po lhc lica l". 127 With a hin t of sarcasm ,

the dissent suggested that if wealthy Canadians were " poised to hijack
this rnuntry's clcc1ion process, an expectation 4some evidence to that
e}lect is reasonable" .128 Despite the A tlorney General' s assc11ions of
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necessity, the legislation could only be regarde<l as a serious "overreaction Lo a no n-cxiste n1 problem". 129
The dissent went on Lo dismiss the suggestion that such draconian
limits arc req uired lo meet the "perceived dangers of inequality, an
uninformed electorate, and a public perception that the syste m is unfair". Do To the conlrary, lhe judges speculated thal the limits cou ld
exacerbate those dangers, produce an electorate that is less well informed
and - by si lenc ing those citizens who would otherwise participate contribute to a perception that the e lection process is unfair. Not only
did the dissent regard the possible benefits of the limit as illusory, it
c laimed that the measures " may actuall y cause more inequality, Jess
civic engagement and greate r disrepute than they avoid". 1 ~ 1 In concluding, the C hief Justice and Major J. spoke in pique of the chilling effect
the limits would have o n political expression, forcing citizens into a
Ho bson' s choice between not speaki ng at a l I during an e lection or having
their voices reduced to a mere whisper. in

(e) Conclusion
The egal itarian model prevai led in Harper v. Canada (Attorney
General), though not without stiff resislan<.:e from membe rs of the Court
who saw Parliament' s nominal s pending allowance as a serious interforence with a sacred Charter e ntitlement the right to partic ipace in the
democratic e lection of a nat.io nal government. As shown above, the
majority opinion openly supported the egalitarian model, but could not
uphold Parliament's limits under the existing law and record without
abandoning its commitment to principled decision making. Bastarac he
J. reduced section 1's evidentiary requirements lO the point of disappearance to uphold limils on expressive activity that was pate ntly valuable in nature and not proven harmful.
As suc h, Harper is in contrad iction with the Court's key precedents
on the Charter and the e lectoral process. As the dissent maintained,
Harper did not force the Court to choose bet ween Libman and Figueroa.
In the context of a national election, Parliament's limit effectively silenced third parties and in func tional terms amounted to a virtual ban

129
130

Ibid., at paras. 34, 35.
Ibid., al para. 38.
131 Ibid. , at parn. 42.
132 Ibid.

GOVERNANCE AND ANARCHY INS. 2(b) JURISPRUDENCE

IOI

on participation. From that perspective, it was unconstitutional for the
same reasons Quebec's scheme was unconstitutional in Libman.
But the majority's approm.:h also abandoned the methodology of

Thomson Newspapers, and contrived a conflict between the rights of
voters and the rights of would-he participants to avoid Figueroa's principle of meaningful participation. As already mentioned, Thomson
Newspapers is one of the Court's most principled section 2(b) decisions.
There, the majority opinion considered the nature of the infringement
and the value of the activity before concluding that deference to Parliament was unwarranted in the circumstances; in addition, it looked at the
evidence of harm in some detail before deciding that the 72 hour opinion
poll blackout was unconstitutional. For its inattention to the requisite
clements of analysis, Harper II stands regrettably but unapologetically
in contrast. Likewise, the majority opinion in Harper had to find a way
of dismissing Figueroa's concept of meaningful participation because
that principle posed an obstacle lo the egalitarian model. There, Harper
drove a wedge between participation under section 3 and participation
under section 2(b) by declaring that the two are incompatible. This
facilitated the conclusion that limits could be imposed on expressive
activity to prevent the voter's meaningful participation from being compromised by the unmcaningful participation of section 2(b) claimants.
It is worrying that in Harper the Court sanctioned the silencing of
third party participants. The more serious problem, however, is that the
end justified the means: it was the end point or result that mattered to
the majority and not the means or discipline of constitutional analysis.
Though it should be the other way around, whenever methodology is in
conflict with an outcome the Court wants to endorse, methodology is
too often abandoned to avoid a result that is required by principled
analysis and respect for the evidence.
4. A MODEL OF GOVERNANCE FOR SECTION 2(b)

In Vancouver Sun the Court held that the presumption of openness
applies to various stages of proceedings under section 83.28, and that
derogations arc unacceptable unless justified under the standard. As a
matter of methodology, the majority opinion reviewed the underlying
values of the open court principle, contextualized those values to section
83.28 hearings, and then applied an evidence-based standard to the
question of exceptions. This approach is exemplary because it reinforced
the underlying values of the principle in the selling of investigative
hearings, and then made derogations conditional on the evidence. In
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doing so, the majority opinion did not flinch from a commitment to
principle that unquestionably makes it more difficult for the state to
conduct investigative hearings under section 83.28.
By contrast, the majority opinion in Harper v. Canada (Attorney
General) was designed to diminish and negate section 2(b)'s guarantee
of expressive freedom, as well as to avoid testing the permissibility of
third party spending limits fairly, on the basis of the evidence. In Vancouver Sun the Court endorsed open court's constitutional status as a
core value. The same point about democratic participation was conceded
in Harper but not given significance in the analysis. Whereas Vancouver
Sun refused to retreat from a presumption of openness, Harper v. Canada
(Attorney General) did not accept that a similar presumption should
apply to expression at the core of democratic government. Third party
spending limits did not warrant serious scrutiny under section 1 because
the majority opinion declared, instead, that the Court should defer to
Parliament. Finally, Vancouver Sun applied an evidence-based standard
to the question whether exceptions can be justified at various points in
a section 83.28 proceeding. To compare, the majority opinion in Harper
was evasive on that question and chose to uphold third party spending
limits which were not demonstrably justified under section I.
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General) is a good example of the
worst the section 2(b) jurisprudence has to offer: it is a decision that
does not rest on principle but is based on instinctive, reflexive, ad hoc
considerations. A system of governance is unimportant in such circumstances, because what matters is the result. Rules and principles of
governance which stand in the way of that result arc a nuisance that must
be disregarded. As the Introduction suggested, this style of decision
making is anarchistic because it is rule and principle-averse; for that
reason it is unacceptable and can only damage the Court's credibility.
As well, it is unnecessary: as decisions like Thomson Newspapers Co.
v. Canada (Attorney General) demonstrate, the Court has developed a
system of governance for other section 2(h) issues that is akin to the
open court model. It simply has to follow that system from issue to issue
and case to case, as a matter of principle.
That model has the same three elements: it affirms section 2(b)'s
underlying values, regardless of the context; it incorporates those values
into a standard that docs not allow them to be easily displaced; and it
makes any limits on expressive activity conditional on section 1 's evidentiary requirements. Three points or further suggestions can be added
to the basic framework. The first is that - as with the open court model
- the section 1 analysis in other section 2(h) cases should he informed
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at the outset by a presumption specifically in favour of content neutrality,
or of the entitlement generally when content neutrality is not in issue.
Second, section 2(b )' s underlying values an<l the elements of the analysis
should be constant, an<l should not shift with subjective perceptions of
the expressive activity al stake. For example, the exacting scrutiny of
Thomson Newspapers cannot stand alongside the undue deference of
Harper, when participation in the democratic process is the issue in both
cases. And third, the requirement that limits on constitutionally protected
activity be supported by evidence of harm must be taken seriously. Nol
to do so makes a mockery of the s. I analysis.
Subject to those qualifications, a model of governance is in place,
and needs only to be followed. Not to <lo so in all s.2(b) decision making
will perpetuate the contradictions and double standards that a comparison of Vancouver Sun an<l Harper reveals; not lo <lo so will also perpetuate the methodological anarchy that identifies Harper, unfortunately, as the new low point in the s.2(h) jurisprudence.

